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1. THE MODEL OF EMERGING TRUTH 
 
In Part 1 of his paper, Weinstein elaborates a meta-mathematical model which, taking 
physical chemistry as its paradigm, attempts to represent in a rigorous and transparent 
manner the interconnections of those features in virtue of which prevailing theories in the 
natural sciences come to be seen as entrenched or anchored—that is to say, as 
epistemically well-grounded. The features in question are functions of the development 
of those theories over time, and concern  
 
(i) the extent to which over time applications of a theory T (conceived of as a 
series of models of T generated by interpreting T as applicable to specific, 
more limited domains) have steadily improved the empirical fit between T 
and the data it attempts to explain,  
(ii)  the extent to which over time applications of T to new and different domains 
exhibits the same sort of steadily improving empirical fit between T and the 
data it attempts to explain,  
(iii) the extent to which over time what T says has been explained by better and 
better “reducing” theories which reinterpret the expressions of T in a way that 
illuminates what T is “really” about—for example, coming to understand or 
explain the correlation between the pressure and temperature of a gas in an 
enclosed container as described in Boyle’s law by equating temperature with 
the mean kinetic energy of the molecules making up the gas and equating 
pressure with force exerted by those molecules on the walls of the container.1 
 
1 Weinstein’s account does not deal explicitly, it seems to me, with an important fact about typical 
reductions which Sellars called attention a long time ago to, and which is well illustrated by the kinetic 
theory of gases as applied to Bolye’s law. Sellars points out that “theories” typically explain why 
“empirical laws” are successful to the extent that they are successful, but also explain why they fail at the 
points at which they fail. Boyle’s law, taken literally, predicts a straight line correlation between pressure 
and temperature. As a matter of empirical fact, this is contrary to what is observed. A graph of observed 
values with temperature on the X axis and pressure on the Y axis is a straight line up to a certain point, after 
which pressure values do not keep pace, as it were, with temperature values. The kinetic theory explains 
this: as temperature increases (i.e. as the velocity of the molecules making up the gas increases) collisions 
between the molecules becomes more frequent, and most such collisions increase the time it takes for the 
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Weinstein claims that his model of emerging truth can help explain the varying 
strength of the warrants which Toulmin had claimed connect the premises of an 
argument to its conclusion. This is made possible by 
 
(a) construing a warrant as a substantive generalization of the sort David 
Hitchcock showed us how to identify as the “covering generation” of an 
argument and  
(b) viewing such generalizations as “explanatory consequences” of some theory 
T, where the strength as a warrant is a function of the extent to which T is 
embedded or anchored in virtue of the 3 sorts of features just described. 
 
On the basis of his model, in Part 2 he defines a series of 5 statuses a theory can 
have—each status in the series representing a higher greater degree of entrenchment. It is 
by reference to these statuses that he formulates three “dialectical principles”—whose 
root idea is that the dialectical obligation of someone who holds a theory T to account for 
an anomaly gets weaker as the status of T increases. 
As with any bold and interesting attempt to deal with a significant problem, there 
is plenty of room to quibble about the details.2 However, in my view, this is a deep and 
                                                                                                                                                 
colliding molecules to reach the sides of the container, thereby retarding the increase in pressure. I suspect 
Weinstein (who actually mentions this example in 2006b, p. 58) would see this simply as a case in which 
reduction, in a sense, increases empirical fit, but I see it as more than this—as a case in which reduction 
induces revision of the theory being reduced (i.e., in one way or another alters the sentences of T). 
Analogous issues arise if we see the relation between Newtonian mechanics and both the special (STR) and 
general theories of relativity (GTR) as a reduction relationship, or as analogous to a reduction relationship. 
What Newtonian mechanics says about computing the velocity of C in relation to A on the basis of the 
velocity of A in relation to be and B in relation to A (namely, that you simply add the two latter velocities) 
is, from the perspective STR, is at best only approximately correct, and is not even approximately correct 
for situations in which velocities approach the speed of light. What GTR says about gravitational force 
contradicts what Newton’s inverse square law says about gravitational force, even though it explains why 
the values generated by the inverse square law are approximately correct in many circumstances. 
2 I personally have reservations about at least three of the details of the story as Weinstein is currently 
telling it. (1) As far as I can see, on Weinstein’s model a theory can achieve a better and better empirical fit 
only as a result of varying interpretations of the same set of sentences (it is differing interpretations of the 
same set of sentences which generate the sequence of models which may or may not exhibit a better fit). To 
my mind, this is counterintuitive. I much prefer Lakatos’ (1970) account, according to which what is 
judged to be progressive is a research program in which many (perhaps all) of the sentences put forward 
change over time, even though the core idea which defines the research program remains the same. On 
Lakatos’ account, the criterion of progressiveness is not necessarily goodness of empirical fit (which can 
easily be achieved by ad hocery), but whether the adjustments made to accommodate anomalies yield 
overall theories which, among other things, make new and previously unforeseen predictions that turn out 
to be true. Perhaps what this indicates in an interaction between what Weinstein calls being “model 
progressive” and being “model chain progressive.” (2) Weinstein, like Hitchcock (and unlike Toulmin, I 
maintain) appears to equate warrants with covering generalizations of the sort that Hitchcock identified. 
My view is that, as Toulmin (2003/1958, p. 98) said, a warrant is “is a general moral of a practical 
character, about the ways in which we can safely argue in view of” the facts put forward as backing for the 
warrant. See Pinto (2006, section 5, esp. pp. 298-300) for my view on the form a warrant should take. 
Weinstein might want to accommodate this point by construing nomic generalizations after the manner of 
Sellars (1963, chapters 10 and 11) as essentially rules of inference. (3)  In a parallel account of MET, 
Weinstein (2006a, p. 54) has said, “Truth, in the final analysis, will be identified with the progressive 
appearance of a model that deserves to be chosen,” invoking Peirce’s view of truth as “the ideal limit to 
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promising account of the interconnections that are relevant to the assessment of any 
contemporary attempt at serious natural science. Anyone interested in argumentation 
theory owes it to himself or herself to make the effort to become thoroughly familiar with 
it. 3 
Weinstein (2006b, p. 81) has said 
 
The intuitive appeal of the construction […] is based on accepting the brute fact that mature 
physical science is the most effective epistemic enterprise available, and thus a likely paradigm for 
a theory of truth […] 
 
But it remains to be seen whether and to what extent his model will prove 
illuminating when applied to inquiries outside the realm of physical science. There are 
two reasons why I am less than sanguine about its prospects for illuminating the 
epistemic status of theories and/or accounts in what Dilthey called the 
Geisteswissenschaften—roughly, the sciences or studies that deal with human things. 
First, to a considerable degree what Dennett called “intentional explanation” remains 
central to the explanatory potential of such inquiries (for starters think of history, 
economics, current cognitive psychology) and, as Dennett4 and Davidson5 both make 
clear, intentional explanation is not oriented by the sort of nomic generalizations which 
                                                                                                                                                 
which endless investigations tend.” Like many others, I am sceptical of the notion of a limit—ideal or 
otherwise - toward which “endless investigations” are tending. To put the matter in other words, just as I 
am sceptical of the concept of a being than which no greater being can be conceived, I am sceptical of the 
idea of a model than which no better model could be conceived. Of course, the concept of truth must be 
accommodated in some manner or other—but ought not, I think, to be accommodated in this manner. 
However, I find what I take to be Weinstein’s idea that judging a theory T from the perspective of 
successor  theories—and most particularly from the perspective of a reducing theory R which reveals what 
T was “really” about—can shed important light on the concept of closeness to the truth (Popper’s 
“verisimilitude”).  
3 For those willing to make that effort, I would personally suggest that a good place to start is Weinstein 
2006b, followed up with Weinstein 2006a. 
4 For Dennett (1981, p. 6), one adopts the “intentional stance” toward a system when one assumes the 
system’s “rationality” (which for Dennett equates to optimal design) and “one predicts behavior […] by 
ascribing to the system the possession of certain information and supposing it to be directed by certain 
goals, and then by working out the most reasonable or appropriate action on the basis of these ascriptions 
and suppositions.”  In other words, what guides us from the ascription of information and supposition of a 
certain goal to the conclusion about what the system will do is not an empirically grounded nomic 
generalization to the effect that entities possessing such-and-such information and having a goal of a 
certain sort always or usually acts in such-and-such way. What guides us is rather our estimation of what is 
it is reasonable or appropriate to do in light of that information and that goal.  
 It is worth stressing that Dennett (Ibid., p 15) also says, “Intentional theory is vacuous as 
psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence.” For more on the 
significance of that remark, see the second paragraph of note 6 below. 
5 Davidson (2001, p. xvi) says that in “Actions, Reasons and Causes” he accepts  
 
the view that teleological explanation of action differs from explanation in the natural sciences in 
that laws are not essentially involved in the former but hold[s] that both sorts of explanation can, 
and often must, invoke causal connections.  
 
In “Mental Events,” Davidson (2001, p. 224) goes even further and endorses “the Principle of the 
Anomalism of the Mental: there are no strict laws at all on the basis of which we can explain and predict 
mental phenomena.” 
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are central to the explanations recognized by MET and which Weinstein wants to equate 
with warrants. And second, I’m aware of hardly anything in the realm of the 
Geisteswissenschaften that I would consider a successful reduction in which a reducing 
theory sheds significant light on the ontology of the theory that’s being reduced.6  
 
2. WEINSTEIN ON POLITICAL ARGUMENT 
 
Let me set out what I think Weinstein is saying about political argument and political 
discourse in Part 3 of his paper. He distinguishes three sorts of claims or conclusions 
operative in such discourse: 
 
(a) those licensed by warrants whose backing lies in broad political (or 
ideological) perspectives  
                                                 
6 At one point Weinstein (2006a, p. 67) does in fact note the “hope that mental predicates can be reduced to 
states of the central nervous system”—citing Churchland 1988. But those like the Churchlands who look to 
neuroscience for “ultimate explanations” of  psychological phenomena  are not proposing to reduce the 
referents of “folk psychological” predicates to states of the central nervous system; like Skinner and 
Watson before them, the Churchlands look forward to a future in which science will be able to eliminate 
the folk psychological terminology still employed in today’s mainstream cognitive psychology in favor of a 
scientific vocabulary which avoids them altogether. Skinner’s view was that it isn’t the business of the 
psychology as such to speculate about the neurological underpinnings of behaviour—to oversimplify 
slightly, scientific psychology should be concerned only with the influence of environment on behaviour, 
and should brook no speculations about “intervening variables” that mediate the interplay among 
behaviour, reinforcers and discriminative stimuli. The Churchlands view, on the other hand, is that 
psychology ought to aim at explanations of behaviour which rely on neuropsychological constructs which 
are largely yet to be identified. As things presently stand, in those areas where current discoveries about the 
functioning of the brain and the nervous system are throwing important light on human behaviour, thought 
and emotion, cerebral and neurological states and occurrences can rarely be identified with “mental events,” 
though they are readily seen to be causes of various aspects of our cognitive and emotional lives. However, 
as Jerry Fodor keeps pointing out, for the most part the only explanations of concrete behaviour currently 
available to us are in terms of belief, desire, etc. According to him, belief/desire explanation is “the only 
game in town.” 
   It is worth noting that Dennett (1981, p. xx of the Preface) explicitly aligns himself with 
eliminative materialism in certain respects. Thus says that “beliefs, desires, pains, mental images, 
experiences” as ordinarily understood are not “good theoretical entities.” He says that some ordinary mental 
entity terms—but not those just mentioned—may “deserve mention in a mature psychology.” About 
those—and about “the theoretical entities that eventually supplant beliefs, desires,“ etc., in a mature 
psychology he is, he says, a  “homuncular functionalist.” One can get a sense of the direction in which he is 
moving when he says (p. 12), “In the end we want to be able to explain the intelligence of man, or beast, in 
terms of his design, and this in turn in terms of the natural selection of this design.” And it needs to be 
recalled that he had earlier said (p. 4),  
 
The essential feature of the design stance is that we make predictions solely from knowledge or 
assumptions about the systems functional design, irrespective of the physical constitution or 
condition of the innards of the particular object.  
 
If these sentences capture the thrust of Dennett’s research program, he does not envisage fleshing it out 
with appeals to neuropsychology. 
 With respect to these issues, consider also the arguments Davidson (2001, pp. 214-25) mounts in 
“Mental Events” in support of “anomalous monism”—the view which holds that all events are physical, but 
“rejects the thesis […] that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations” (p. 214). 
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(b) those licensed by “normative tending warrants, ranging from prudential 
requirements such as policies on cost value analysis to more deeply 
intractable commitments as in substantive moral constraints (equal 
opportunity, specific rights, appeals to the common good)”—about which 
Weinstein has little to say here 
(c) those licensed by warrants whose backing lies in social and political facts and 
theories—these include (i) warrants “grounded in law and other de facto 
political policies,” (ii) warrants “drawn from and by analogy with social 
science principles, sociological, psychological and even anthropological 
claims that proffer generalizations of various strengths about human 
behaviour” and (iii) warrants whose backing lies in economic fact and theory. 
 
Having distinguished these phenomena, there are two central points he makes 
about the first and third. 
 
1) Broad political perspectives  
 
leave little room for rational negotiation, since they result in parallel perspectives, equally 
persuasive to their adherents, but relatively incapable of creating consensus […] (p. 9) 
 
2) Discussions which eschew appeal to broad political or ideological 
perspectives appeal instead to “shared backing and available economic 
models.”  Weinstein thinks that the merits of proposals made “in light of such 
backing” can yield to “rational negotiation.”  He thinks that their merits can 
and should be assessed in light of the dialectical principles described in Part 
2—which, of course, presuppose his theory of emerging truth.  
 
I think Weinstein is absolutely right to call attention to the difference between 
political arguments that turn on appeal to “broad political perspectives” and those that 
don’t, and is correct in his explanation and assessment of the futility of such argument in 
the public sphere. Moreover, I think he is right to suppose having a model like—or, as I 
would rather say, loosely analogous to—MET would help us in understanding what is at 
stake when we try to assess proposals which appeal to “shared backing and available 
economic models.” However, in light of my remarks above about the 
Geisteswissenschaften, I remain sceptical about how much light a model which takes 
physical chemistry as its paradigm will be able to shed on the assessment of such 
proposals.  
 
3. WEINSTEIN’S POSTSCRIPT 
 
In his Postscript Weinstein says,  
 
The best we can hope for is a broad liberal education that permits of the evaluation of expert 
presentations based on a basic familiarity with the field and its arguments along with a spirit of 
critical inquiry. 
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He connects this point with McPeck’s rejection of the very idea of a course in critical 
thinking or (what is not the same thing) informal logic. Indeed Weinstein concludes with 
the words, ”informal logic as a quasi-formal discipline is impossible.” It seems to me that 
none of this is warranted by the fact that “evaluation of expert presentations” must be 
“based on a basic familiarity with the field and its arguments.” To what “field” does that 
point, and the arguments for it, belong? Surely both arise from an examination of 
argument as it occurs in a broad variety of different fields as well as argumentation that 
transpires in “the public sphere,” an examination carried out against the background of 
the literature produced by a certain research community—that is to say, from informal 
logic. Of course, introduction to or mastery of informal logic does not suffice for 
evaluating expert presentations made by physicists, or chemists, or theologians, or 
clinical psychologists. Indeed, that is one of the main ideas to be got across in a course in 
critical thinking or informal logic, And at my university such courses are the only place a 
student is likely to encounter notion that he or she needs a broad liberal education of the 
sort Weinstein has in mind. 
 
          Link to paper 
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